

Message Text

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PAGE 01 NDJAME 02408 201050Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----001143 201055Z /23
O 200935Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7421

S E C R E T NDJAMENA 2408

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CF, XA, XJ
SUBJ: AFRICAN PROBLEM SOLVING

REF: STATE 153145

1. SUGGESTION REFTEL IS DIFFICULT TO COMMENT UPON IN ABSENCE OF A DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT UNQUOTE. IF THIS PHARASE MERELY MEANS NO U.S. COMBAT TROOPS, SUGGESTED APPROACH MIGHT BE VALUABLE, BUT IF IT MEANS NO TYPE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR FINANCING, WE WILL BE LAUGHED OUT OF NEARLY EVERY OFFICE IN WHICH WE MAKE OUR CASE.

2. THE CONTENTION THAT IT IS THE AFRICANS WHO HAVE, BY COMMISSION OR OMISSION, PERMITTED THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE MILITARY ROLE IN AFRICA, IS FALLACIOUS. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE CONDONED, AND OTHERS WELCOMED AND INVITED SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE, IT IS UNFAIR TO BLAME THE REMAINDER FOR THIS ACTION; AND IT IS UTOPIAN TO THINK THAT THE REMAINDER EVEN IF UNITED, WHICH THEY ARE NOT, WOULD HAVE BEEN STRONG ENOUGH TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THE INTERVENTION ANYWAY. IN THE FRAGILE AFRICAN CONTEXT, SUCH

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OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CAN BE COUNTERED ONLY BY OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

3. FOR US TO OFFER TO SHOW THE AFRICANS HOW TO MEET THE CHALLENGE IN AN AFRICA FASHION WOULD BE PATRONIZING. IN ADDITION, I DOUBT IF WE HAVE YET LEARNED ENOUGH ABOUT AFRICA AND ITS PROBLEMS OR

COUNTER-INSURGENCY TO GIVE GOOD, PRACTICAL ADVICE.

4. THE TENSE OF THE VERB IS INCORRECT IN WARNING THAT, UNLESS AFRICANS UNDERSTAND THAT THE TOLERATION OF SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE INEVITABLE WILL LEAD TO AFRICA'S BECOMING AN EAST/WEST COCKPIT IN WHICH OUTSIDE POWERS WILL CONTEND; AFRICA IS ALREADY SUCH A COCKPIT. THE SOVIETS, CUBANS, AND THEIR CLIENTS HAVE WON A NUMBER OF INITIAL VICTORIES AND WOULD HAVE WON SIGNIFICANTLY MORE IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVELY OPPOSED BY THE FRENCH. WE MAY CHOOSE JUSTIFIABLY TO SULK IN OUR TENT, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE IS NO BATTLE GOING ON.

5. THE COMMENTS ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE OAU AND THE SUGGESTION THAT MORE USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE SOUND; BUT WOULD BE BETTER ACTED UPON IN RELATION TO PARTICULAR SITUATIONS RATHER THAN AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE.

6. IT IS DOUBTFUL IF A STATEMENT DECLARING OUR INTENTION NEVER TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NEW, MORE DANGEROUS FORMS OF WEAPONS INTO AFRICA, AND TO EXACT SIMILAR PLEDGES FROM OTHERS, WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT WHATSOEVER ON THE PRESENT OR FORESEEABLE SITUATION. NO SUCH WEAPONS ARE INVOLVED,
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OR INDEED NECESSARY IN AFRICA.

7. IN CONSIDERING WAYS TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE AT THE ONSET THAT AS DISTASTEFUL AS IT MAY BE, OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION CANNOT BE COUNTERED BY EQUIPMENT ALONE. FOREIGN MANPOWER (NOT NECESSARILY AMERICAN) FOR TRAINING, LEADERSHIP, AND TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS IS IMPERATIVE TO BALANCE THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIETS OR THEIR SURROGATES; WITNESS ANGOLA, SHABA, SOMALIA, THE WESTERN SAHARA, OR CHAD.

8. IN GENERAL, THE IDEA OF TALKING TO AFRICAN LEADERS ABOUT THE SOVIET/CUBAN THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE CONTINENT IS SOUND IF WE ARE WILLING TO DO ANYTHING BESIDES TALK. IF NOT, WE SHOULD KEEP QUIET; RECOGNIZING THAT IN SO DOING, THE SOVIET/CUBAN ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE BY MILITARY MEASURES WILL INCREASE. IN THE LONG RUN, SOVIETS MAY WELL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DOMINATE AFRICA (ALTHOUGH EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT

THEIR HEAVEY-HANDED METHODS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY
SUCCESSFUL IN THIS FIELD).HOWEVER, EVEN IF IN LONG
RUN SOVIET FAILURE WAS ASSURED,THERE SEEMS TO BE
A LEGITIMATE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS WISE OR
FEASIBLE FOR US TO SIT ON SIDELINES AND TRY TO OUTWAIT
THE SITUATION. BRADFORD

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978NDJAME02408
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780256-0746
Format: TEL
From: NDJAMENA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780640/aaaabiox.tel
Line Count: 122
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 62b24685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 153145
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2285095
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AFRICAN PROBLEM SOLVING
TAGS: PDEV, CF, XA, XJ
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/62b24685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014